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ABSTRACT
This paper explains the key factors that determine the effectiveness of government purchases as a means
of increasing output and employment in New Keynesian models, through a series of simple examples
that can be solved analytically. Delays in the adjustment of prices or wages can allow for larger multipliers
than exist in the case of fully flexible prices and wages; in a fairly broad class of simple models, the
multiplier is 1 in the case that the monetary authority maintains a constant path for real interest rates.
The multiplier can be considerably smaller, however, if the monetary authority raises real interest
rates in response to increases in inflation or real activity resulting from the fiscal stimulus. A large
multiplier is especially plausible when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates; in such a case, expected utility is maximized by expanding government purchases
to at least partially fill the output gap that would otherwise exist owing to the central bank's inability
to cut interest rates. However, it is important in such a case that neither the increased government purchases
nor the increased taxes required to finance them be expected to persist beyond the period over which
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michael.woodford@columbia.eduThe recent worldwide economic crisis has brought renewed attention to the ques-
tion of the usefulness of government spending as a way of stimulating aggregate
economic activity and employment during a slump. Interest in ¯scal stimulus as an
option has been greatly increased by the fact that in many countries by the end
of 2008, the short-term nominal interest rate used as the main operating target for
monetary policy had reached zero | or at any rate, some very low value regarded as
an e®ective lower bound by the central bank in question | so that further interest
rate cuts were no longer available to stave o® spiraling unemployment and fears of
economic collapse. Increases in government spending were at least a dimension on
which it was possible for governments to do more | but how e®ective should this be
expected to be as a remedy?
Much public discussion of this issue has been based on old-fashioned models (both
Keynesian and anti-Keynesian) that take little account of the role of intertemporal
optimization and expectations in the determination of aggregate economic activity.
The present paper instead reviews the implications for this question of the kind of New
Keynesian DSGE models that are now commonly used in monetary policy analysis.
It focuses on one speci¯c question of current interest: the determinants of the size of
the e®ect on aggregate output of an increase in government purchases, or what has
been known since Keynes (1936) as the government expenditure \multiplier."
I discuss this issue in the context of a series of models that are each simple enough
for the e®ects to be computed analytically, so that the consequences of parameter
variation for the quantitative results will be completely clear. It is hoped that the
economic mechanisms behind the various results will be fairly transparent as well. I
also restrict my attention to policy experiments that are de¯ned in such a way that
the time path of the increase in output has the same shape as the time path of the
increase in government purchases, so that there is a clear meaning to the calculation
of a \multiplier" (though more generally this need not be the case). These models
are too simple to be taken seriously as the basis for quantitative estimates of the
e®ects of some actually contemplated policy change; nonetheless, I believe that the
mechanisms displayed in these simple examples explain many of the numerical results
obtained by a variety of recent authors in the context of empirical New Keynesian
DSGE models,1 and the simpler analysis here may be of pedagogical value.
I begin be reviewing in section 1 the neoclassical benchmark under which in-
1See, for example, comments below on the studies of Christiano et al. (2009), Cogan et al. (2010),
Erceg and Lind¶ e (2009), and Uhlig (2010).
1tertemporal optimization should result in a multiplier less than 1. Section 2 then
shows that in simple New Keynesian models, if monetary policy maintains a constant
real interest rate, the multiplier is instead equal to 1. Section 3 shows that under
more realistic assumptions about monetary policy under normal circumstances, the
multiplier will be less than 1, because real interest rates will increase; but section 4
shows that when the zero lower bound is a binding constraint on monetary policy,
the multiplier is instead greater than 1, because ¯scal expansion should cause the real
interest rate to fall. Section 5 considers the welfare e®ects of government purchases
in these various case, while section 6 brie°y discusses the consequences of allowing
for tax distortions. Section 7 summarizes the paper's conclusions.
1 A Neoclassical Benchmark
I shall begin by reviewing the argument that government purchases necessarily crowd
out private expenditure (at least to some extent), according to a neoclassical general-
equilibrium model in which wages and prices are both assumed to be perfectly °exible.
This provides a useful benchmark, relative to which I shall wish to discuss the con-
sequences of allowing for wage or price rigidity. I shall con¯ne my analysis here to
a relatively special case of the neoclassical model, ¯rst analyzed by Barro and King
(1984), though the result that the multiplier for government purchases is less than
one does not require such special assumptions.2
1.1 A Competitive Economy
Consider an economy made up of a large number of identical, in¯nite-lived households,




t [u(Ct) ¡ v(Ht)]; (1.1)
where Ct is the quantity consumed in period t of the economy's single produced
good, Ht is hours of labor supplied in period t, the period utility functions satisfy
u0 > 0;u00 < 0;v0 > 0;v00 > 0; and the discount factor satis¯es 0 < ¯ < 1: The good
2More general expositions of the neoclassical theory include Barro (1989), Aiyagari et al. (1992),
and Baxter and King (1993).
2is produced using a production technology yielding output
Yt = f(Ht); (1.2)
where f0 > 0;f00 < 0: This output is consumed either by households or by the
government, so that in equilibrium
Yt = Ct + Gt (1.3)
each period. I shall begin by considering the perfect foresight equilibrium of a purely
deterministic economy; the alternative ¯scal policies considered will correspond to
alternative deterministic sequences for the path of government purchases fGtg. I shall
also simplify (until section 6) by assuming that government purchases are ¯nanced
through lump-sum taxation; a change in the path of government purchases is assumed
to imply a change in the path of tax collections so as to maintain intertemporal
government solvency. (The exact timing of the path of tax collections is irrelevant in
the case of lump-sum taxes, in accordance with the standard argument for \Ricardian
equivalence.")








This is a requirement for optimal labor supply by the representative household, where







This is a requirement for pro¯t-maximizing labor demand by the representative ¯rm.
In order for these conditions to simultaneously be true, one must have v0=u0 = f0 at
each point in time.
Using (1.2) to substitute for Ht and (1.3) to substitute for Ct in this relation, one
obtains an equilibrium condition
u
0(Yt ¡ Gt) = ~ v
0(Yt) (1.6)
in which Yt is the only endogenous variable. Here ~ v(Y ) ´ v(f¡1(Y )) is the disutility
to the representative household of supplying a quantity of output Y , so that ~ v0 =
3v0=f0: (Note that our previous assumptions imply that ~ v0 > 0; ~ v00 > 0:) This is also
obviously the ¯rst-order condition for the planning problem of choosing Yt maximize
utility, given preferences, technology, and the level of government purchases; thus
this equilibrium condition re°ects the familiar result that competitive equilibrium
maximizes the welfare of the representative household (in the case that there is a
representative household).
Condition (1.6) can be solved for equilibrium output Yt as a function of Gt. Dif-








where ´u > 0 is the negative of the elasticity of u0 and ´v > 0 is the elasticity of
~ v0 with respect to increases in Y .3 It follows that the multiplier is positive, but
necessarily less than 1. This means that private expenditure (here, entirely modeled
as non-durable consumer expenditure) is necessarily crowded out, at least partially, by
government purchases. In the case that the degree of intertemporal substitutability of
private expenditure is high (so that ´u is small), while the marginal cost of employing
additional resources in production is sharply rising (that ´v is large), the multiplier
may be only a small fraction of 1.
1.2 Monopolistic Competition
The mere existence of some degree of market power in either product or labor markets
does not much change this result. Suppose, for example, that instead of a single
good there are a large number of di®erentiated goods, each with a single monopoly
producer; and, as in the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, let
us suppose that the representative household's preferences are again of the form (1.1),
but that Ct is now a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregate of the household's










where ct(i) is the quantity purchased of good i, and µ > 1 is the elasticity of sub-
stitution among di®erentiated goods. Let us suppose for simplicity that each good
3That is, ´u ´ ¡¹ Y u00=u0; ´v ´ ¹ Y ~ v00=~ v0:
4is produced using a common production function of the form (1.2), with a single
homogeneous labor input used in producing all goods. In this model, each producer
will face a downward-sloping demand curve for its product, with elasticity µ; pro¯t
maximization will then require not production to the point where marginal cost is
equal to the price for which it sells its good, but only to the point at which the price






Hence condition (1.5) must be replaced by the requirement that pt(i) = ¹Wt=f0(ht(i))
for each good i.
Let us consider a monopolistically competitive equilibrium, in which each ¯rm
chooses its price optimally, taking as given the wage and the demand curve that it
faces. (I continue to assume perfectly °exible prices, and a competitive labor market,
or some other form of e±cient labor contracting.) Since each ¯rm faces the same
wage and a demand curve of the same form, in equilibrium each ¯rm chooses the
same price, hires the same amount of labor, and produces the same quantity. It
follows that we must also have
Pt = ¹Wt=f
0(Ht); (1.10)
where Pt is the common price of all goods (and also the price of the composite good)
and Ht is the common quantity of labor hired by each ¯rm (and also the aggregate
hours worked). It also follows that aggregate output Yt (in units of the composite
good) and aggregate hours worked Ht must again satisfy (1.2). Optimal labor supply
by the representative household also continues to require that (1.4) hold, where Pt is
now the price of the composite good.
Relations (1.2), (1.4) and (1.10) allow us to derive a simple generalization of
equation (1.6),
u
0(Yt ¡ Gt) = ¹~ v
0(Yt) (1.11)
which again su±ces to determine equilibrium output as a function of the current level
of government purchases. While the equilibrium level of output is no longer e±cient,
the multiplier is still given by (1.7), regardless of the value of ¹. A similar conclusion
is obtained in the case of a constant markup of wages relative to households' marginal
rate of substitution: aggregate output is again determined by (1.11), where ¹ is now
5an \e±ciency wedge" that depends on the degree of market power in both product
and labor markets, and so the multiplier calculation remains the same.4
A di®erent result can be obtained, however, if the size of the e±ciency wedge
is endogenous. One of the most obvious sources of such endogeneity is delay in
the adjustment of wages or prices to changing market conditions.5 If prices are not
immediately adjusted in full proportion to the increase in marginal cost resulting
from an increase in government purchases, the right-hand side of (1.10) will increase
more than does the left-hand side; as a consequence the right-hand side of (1.11)
will increase more than does the left-hand side of that expression. This implies an
increase in Yt greater than the one implied by (1.11). One can similarly show that if
wages are not immediately adjusted in full proportion to the increase in the marginal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, the right-hand side of (1.11)
will increase more than does the left-hand side, again implying a larger multiplier
than the one given in (1.7).
Hence the key to obtaining a larger multiplier is an endogenous decline in the
labor-e±ciency wedge.6 However, in a model with sticky prices or wages, the degree
to which the e±ciency wedge changes depends on the degree to which aggregate
demand di®ers from what it was expected to be when prices and wages were set.
Equilibrium output is thus no longer determined solely by supply-side considerations;
we must instead consider the e®ects of government purchases on aggregate demand.
2 A New Keynesian Benchmark
What is the size of the government expenditure multiplier if prices or wages are
sticky | as many empirical DSGE models posit, in order to account for the observed
4The same result is also obtained in the case of a constant rate of taxation or subsidization of
labor income, ¯rms' payrolls, consumption spending, or ¯rms' revenues. The tax distortions simply
change the size of the e±ciency wedge ¹ in equation (1.11).
5Another possible source of endogeneity is cyclical variation in desired markups due to implicit
collusion, as in the model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). In that model, a temporary increase
in government purchases reduces the ability of oligopolistic producers to maintain collusion; the
resulting decline in markups increases equilibrium output more than would occur in a perfectly
competitive model.
6Hall (2009) says that the key is a decline in the price markup; but this is not the only possibility,
as is discussed further at the end of section 2.
6e®ects of monetary policy on real activity? The answer does not depend solely on
the assumed structure of the economy. If prices or wages are sticky, monetary policy
a®ects real activity, and so the consequences of an increase in government purchases
depend on the monetary policy response. One might suppose that the question
of interest should be the e®ects of government purchases \leaving monetary policy
unchanged"; but one must take care to specify just what is assumed to be unchanged.
It is not the same thing to assume that the path of the money supply is unchanged
as to assume that the path of interest rates is unchanged, or that the central bank's
in°ation target is unchanged, or that the central bank continues to adhere to a \Taylor
rule," to list only a few of the possibilities.
I shall ¯rst consider, as a useful benchmark, a policy experiment in which it is
assumed that the central bank maintains an unchanged path for the real interest rate,
regardless of the path of government purchases. This case corresponds, essentially to
the standard \multiplier" calculation in undergraduate textbooks, where the question
asked is how much the \IS curve" shifts to the right | that is, how much output
would be increased if the real interest rate were not to change. Here I wish to consider
a similar question; but in a dynamic model, it is necessary to de¯ne the hypothetical
policy in terms of the entire forward path of the real interest rate. The answer to this
question provides a useful benchmark for two reasons. The ¯rst is that it is simple
to calculate; but the second is that the answer is the same under a wide range of
alternative assumptions about the nature of price or wage stickiness.
Again I consider a purely deterministic economy, and let the path of government
purchases be given by a sequence fGtg such that Gt ! ¹ G for large t; the long-
run level of government purchases ¹ G is held constant while considering alternative
possible assumptions about near-term government purchases. Thus I shall consider
only the consequences of temporary variations in the level of government purchases.
I shall furthermore assume that monetary policy brings about a zero rate of in°ation
in the long run. (That is, the in°ation rate f¼tg is also a deterministic sequence, such
that ¼t ! 0 for large t.) Under quite weak assumptions about the nature of wage
and price adjustment, these assumptions about monetary and ¯scal policy in the
long run imply that the economy converges asymptotically to a steady state in which
government purchases equal ¹ G each period, in°ation is equal to zero, and output is
equal to some constant level ¹ Y .7
7Under many reasonable assumptions about wage and price adjustment, the steady-state level of





each period, where rt is the (continuously compounded) real rate of return between t
and t+1. It follows from (2.1) that in the long-run steady state, rt = ¹ r ´ ¡log¯ > 0
each period. Since I wish to consider a monetary policy that maintains a constant
real rate of interest, regardless of the temporary variation in government purchases, it
is necessary to assume that monetary policy maintains rt = ¹ r for all t; this is the only
constant real interest rate consistent with the assumption of asymptotic convergence
to a long-run steady state.
We may suppose that the central bank chooses an operating target for the nominal
interest rate it according to a Taylor rule of the form
it = ¹ {t + Á¼¼t + Áy log(Yt=¹ Y ) (2.2)
where the response coe±cients Á¼;Áy are chosen so as to imply a determinate equi-
librium under this policy,8 and where the sequence f¹ {tg is chosen so that ¹ {t ! ¹ r for
large t (the requirement for asymptotic convergence to the zero-in°ation steady state)
and so that the equilibrium determined by this monetary policy involves rt = ¹ r each
period. However, there is no need to assume that the equilibrium is implemented
in this way; all that matters for the analysis here is that a monetary policy can be
speci¯ed that implements the equilibrium in which the real interest rate is constant.
Let us set aside for the moment the question whether such an equilibrium ex-
ists (and what sort of monetary policy implements it), and consider what such an
equilibrium must be like if it exists. If rt = ¹ r for all t, it follows from (2.1) that
Ct = Ct+1 for all t. Thus the representative household must be planning a constant
level of consumption over the inde¯nite future, at whatever level is consistent with its
intertemporal budget constraint. Convergence to the steady state referred to above
implies that Ct ! ¹ C ´ ¹ Y ¡ ¹ G for large t; hence equilibrium must involve Ct = ¹ C for
output ¹ Y will be the same as in the model with °exible wages and prices, namely, the solution to
(1.11) when Gt = ¹ G:
8See Woodford (2003, Proposition 4.3) for the conditions required in the case of the Calvo model
of price adjustment described in section 3. In general, the precise conditions for determinacy of
equilibrium will depend on the details of wage and price adjustment.
8all t.9 It then follows from (1.3) that
Yt = ¹ C + Gt (2.3)
for all t. Hence in this case, we ¯nd once again that equilibrium output depends only
on the level of government purchases in the current period | so that the e®ects of a
given size increase in government purchases are the same regardless of how persistent
the increase is expected to be10 | but now the multiplier (dYt=dGt) is equal to 1.
There is no crowding out of private expenditure by government purchases, though no
stimulus of additional private expenditure, either.11
An interesting feature of this simple result is that it is quite independent of any
very speci¯c assumption about the dynamics of wage and price adjustment: under
the particular assumption about monetary policy made here, the e®ect on aggregate
output depends purely on the demand side of the model. The supply side of the model
matters only in solving for the implied path of in°ation, wages and employment, and
for the monetary policy required to achieve the hypothesized path of real interest
rates. I have, however, made one crucial assumption about the supply side: I have
supposed that it is possible for monetary policy to maintain rt = ¹ r at all times,
regardless of the chosen short-run path of government purchases. This assumption
is violated by the model with fully °exible wages and prices. However, under many
speci¯cations of sticky prices or wages (or both), it is possible for monetary policy to
a®ect real interest rates, and a path for monetary policy can be chosen under which
rt = ¹ r will hold, in the case of any path for government purchases satisfying certain
bounds.
Essentially, it is simply necessary to use the model of wage and price adjustment
implied by such a model to determine the paths of wages and prices implied by the
9This is the point at which it matters to the argument that I consider only paths for government
purchases such that Gt ! ¹ G. In the case of a change in the long-run level of government purchases,
the long-run steady-state value ¹ C would also change.
10This statement is subject to the proviso, of course, that the long-run level of government pur-
chases, ¹ G, is not changed. If the short-run increase in Gt actually implies that government purchases
will have to be reduced in the long run, then consumption will increase, and the multiplier will be
greater than 1, as concluded by Corsetti et al. (2009).
11It is possible, instead, to obtain an increase in private expenditure, and hence a multiplier greater
than 1, if household preferences are non-separable between consumption and leisure, as discussed
by Monacelli and Perotti (2010) and Bilbiie (2009).
9dynamics of consumption and output solved for above. Assuming that a solution
exists, the implied path for in°ation and hence for in°ation expectations will then
yield the required path of the nominal interest rate. (Adjoining a money-demand
equation to the model would then allow one to determine the required path of the
money supply as well.) In the next section, I present the equations of a particular
familiar model of price adjustment (the model with °exible wages and Calvo-style
staggered adjustment of prices), and show how it is possible to determine the mon-
etary policy required to keep the real interest rate constant in that model. But it
should be evident that the conclusion that some monetary policy would be consistent
with a constant real rate is in no way dependent on the special details of the Calvo
model of price adjustment; it is equally true in many other models of the dynamics
of price adjustment, in models with sticky wages instead of (or in addition to) sticky
prices, in models with \sticky information" instead of sticky prices, and so on.
It may seem surprising that the multiplier in this baseline case is independent of
the degree of °exibility of prices and wages; there thus appears to be a discontinuity
in the case of complete °exibility (and full information), where the multiplier is given
by (1.7). The explanation is that the derivation of (2.3) requires that it be possible
for monetary policy to maintain a constant real interest rate despite an increase in
government purchases; and while such a policy is technically possible, according to
the model of price adjustment presented in section 3.1, for any positive degree of
price stickiness, as the degree of price stickiness becomes small, the required degree
of in°ation becomes extreme. Hence it becomes implausible to believe that a central
bank will actually maintain a constant real interest rate (even if this is technically
feasible) in the case of su±ciently °exible (even though not perfectly °exible) prices.
For this reason, the relevance of the New Keynesian benchmark does depend on the
existence of a su±cient degree of stickiness of prices, wages, information (or more
than one of these).
It is also noteworthy that in this benchmark case, the predicted multiplier is
independent of the degree to which resource utilization is slack; in the derivation of
(2.3), the costs of supplying a given level of output do not ¯gure at all. But once
again, supply costs do generally matter for the rate of in°ation associated with a
given size of government purchases under the assumed monetary policy; more steeply
increasing marginal costs as output increases will lead to larger price increases. Again,
this means that it is much more plausible to imagine a central bank holding real
10interest rates constant in response to an increase in government purchases when
there is a great deal of excess capacity (so that marginal cost increases little with
increased output), rather than when capacity utilization is high (so that marginal
cost is steeply increasing); and if capacity constraints are severe enough, it may
actually be infeasible to maintain a constant real interest rate under any monetary
policy, because no amount of monetary stimulus can induce the increase in supply
required in order for the current goods not to be expensive relative to future goods
(or indexed bonds).
The simple case considered in this section su±ces to establish that New Keynesian
models can easily deliver multipliers higher than the one predicted by the neoclassical
model; this makes them easier to reconcile with empirical evidence. For example,
Hall's (2009) review of the empirical evidence concludes that \GDP rises by roughly
the amount of an increase in government purchases" under normal circumstances,12
which is to say that the multiplier is roughly 1. While this is too large an e®ect to be
consistent with neoclassical theory, at least in standard models, it is easily consistent
with a simple New Keynesian model, at least to the extent that monetary policy
has in fact maintained a relatively constant real interest rate in response to ¯scal
shocks.13 (The response of the real interest rate to ¯scal shocks is seldom considered
in the literature that Hall reviews; this is a topic that deserves further attention.)
Hall (2009) argues that while New Keynesian models can explain the possibil-
ity of a multiplier on the order of 1, they can do so only under the hypothesis of
countercyclical movement in the markup of prices relative to marginal cost, and he
questions the realism of the latter assumption, citing evidence such as the ¯ndings of
Nekarda and Ramey (2010). Nekarda and Ramey ¯nd that increases in government
purchases have little e®ect on their measure of the markup (the ratio of average labor
productivity to the real wage). However, New Keynesian models do not necessarily
imply that this measure of the markup must decline in response to an increase in
12He notes that the multiplier may be substantially larger when monetary policy is constrained
by the zero bound; this special case is discussed below in section 4.
13Under some familiar hypotheses about monetary policy, such as the Taylor rule, the New Key-
nesian model would predict a smaller multiplier, as is discussed in section 3. However, authors such
as Taylor (1999) and Clarida et al. (2000) argue that U.S. monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s
was considerably more \passive" than the Taylor rule would prescribe, allowing the real interest rate
to fall in response to increases in in°ation, and it is possible that the ¯scal multipliers found in the
empirical literature mainly re°ect responses from such periods.
11government purchases; the real wage may remain constant, or even fall, if wages are
sticky, while average labor productivity may remain constant, or even increase, in the
presence of overhead labor or procyclical e®ort (to cite only two familiar hypotheses).
Yet hypotheses of these types, that are consistent with the Nekarda-Ramey ¯ndings,
are also consistent with the reasoning given above; under the hypothesis of a cen-
tral bank that maintains the path of real interest rates ¯xed despite the increase in
government purchases, the multiplier will equal 1. Hence Hall's critique of the basic
mechanism that allows New Keynesian models to predict multipliers of this size seems
to be misplaced.
3 Alternative Degrees of Monetary Accommoda-
tion
The result obtained in the previous section applies only under one speci¯c assumption
about monetary policy, namely, that the path of the real interest rate will remain
¯xed despite the temporary increase in government purchases. Under alternative
assumptions about the degree of monetary accommodation of the ¯scal stimulus,
the size of the increase in output will be di®erent. Indeed, under some assumptions
about monetary policy, the output response predicted by the New Keynesian model
may be even smaller than in the neoclassical model. Hence an empirical ¯nding of a
multiplier less than 1, under the monetary policy that has been followed historically,
does not necessarily discon¯rm the validity of the New Keynesian model.
In order to illustrate this point by computing multipliers associated with alter-
native monetary policies, it is necessary to adopt a speci¯c model of wage and price
adjustment. The calculations in this section and the one that follows are based on a
particular, very familiar New Keynesian model, in which wages are °exible and prices
adjust according to the Calvo model of staggered price adjustment.
3.1 In°ation Dynamics and Aggregate Supply: A Simple
Model
Let us assume Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, as discussed in section 1, but
now let us suppose that each di®erentiated good i is produced using a constant-
12returns-to-scale technology of the form
yt(i) = kt(i)f(ht(i)=kt(i)); (3.1)
where kt(i) is the quantity of capital goods used in production by ¯rm i, ht(i) are the
hours of labor hired by the ¯rm, and f(¢) is the same increasing, concave function as
before. I shall assume for simplicity that the total supply of capital goods is exoge-
nously given (and can be normalized to equal 1), but that capital goods are allocated
to ¯rms each period through a competitive rental market. This assumption implies
that each ¯rm will have a common marginal cost of production, a homogeneous de-
gree 1 function of the two competitive factor prices, that is independent of the ¯rm's
chosen scale of production.
Cost-minimization will imply that each ¯rm chooses the same labor/capital ratio,
regardless of its scale of production, and in equilibrium this common labor/capital
ratio will equal Ht, the aggregate labor supply (recalling that aggregate capital is




If we assume °exible wages and a competitive labor market, (1.4) must again hold in





Note that in the case that each ¯rm's price is a ¯xed markup ¹ over marginal cost
(as would follow from Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition with °exible prices),
condition (3.3) together with (1.2) would imply that output must satisfy (1.11), as
concluded previously.
In the Calvo model of staggered price adjustment, it is assumed that fraction 1¡®
of all ¯rms reconsider their prices in any given period, while the others continue to
charge the same price as in the previous period. (The probability that any ¯rm will
reconsider its price in any period is assumed to be independent of the time since it
last reconsidered its price, and of how high or low its current price may be.) To a
log-linear approximation,14 the optimal price p¤
t chosen by each ¯rm that reconsiders
14Here I log-linearize around the zero-in°ation steady state, which under the assumed monetary
13its price in period t will be given by15
logp
¤






(This is just a weighted geometric average of the prices p
f
t+j = ¹St+j that a pro¯t-
maximizing °exible-price ¯rm would choose in each of the future periods t + j.)
Since in each period, a fraction (1 ¡ ®)®j of all ¯rms chose their current price j
periods earlier (for each j ¸ 0), in a similar log-linear approximation the price index
evolves according to a law of motion
logPt = ®logPt¡1 + (1 ¡ ®)logp
¤
t: (3.5)
Condition (3.5) together with (3.4) allows one to show that
log(p
¤




j Et[log¹ + logSt+j ¡ logPt+j]: (3.6)
Thus a ¯rm that reconsiders its price will choose a high relative price to the extent
that a weighted geometric average of the pro¯t-maximizing relative prices ¹St+j=Pt+j
in the various future periods t+j is high. In the case of fully °exible prices, Pt must
equal p¤
t each period, in which case (3.6) requires that Pt = ¹St each period, leading
again to (1.11). But with sticky prices, it is possible for Pt to di®er from ¹St (and
hence for Yt to violate equation (1.11)); this simply requires that ¯rms that reconsider
their prices choose a price di®erent from the general level of prices (p¤
t 6= Pt), resulting
in in°ation or de°ation (Pt 6= Pt¡1) in accordance with (3.5).
A similar log-linear approximation to (3.3) takes the form16
log(St=Pt) = ¡log¹ + ´v ^ Yt + ´u(^ Yt ¡ ^ Gt); (3.7)
policy is the equilibrium in the case that government purchases equal ¹ G each period; hence the
approximation is valid if in all periods Gt remains close enough to ¹ G: Further details of the calculation
sketched here are presented in Woodford (2003, chap. 3).
15Here I write the condition in the more general form that applies in the case of a stochastic
environment, as preparation for further applications below.
16Note that because the steady state around which the approximation is computed involves the
same level of production of each good, log-linearization of (3.1) and integration over i implies that,
to this order of approximation, the aggregate quantities Yt and Ht satisfy (1.2). This allows an
expression to be derived for real marginal cost as a function of ^ Yt and ^ Gt only.
14where the elasticities ´v;´u > 0 are de¯ned as in (1.7), and the deviations from
steady state are de¯ned as ^ Yt ´ log(Yt=¹ Y ); ^ Gt ´ (Gt ¡ ¹ G)=¹ Y :17 Hence an increase
in ^ Yt greater than the one implied by the °exible-price multiplier (1.7) requires that
real marginal cost St=Pt increases. Substituting this into (3.6), we obtain
log(p
¤




j Et[^ Yt+j ¡ ¡ ^ Gt+j]; (3.8)
where ¡ < 1 is the °exible-price multiplier de¯ned in (1.7). Then since (3.5) implies
that the in°ation rate is given by











j Et[^ Yt+j ¡ ¡ ^ Gt+j]; (3.10)
where · ´ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)(´u + ´v)=® > 0:
We can now answer the question whether it is possible for monetary policy to
maintain a constant real interest rate in the case of an arbitrary path fGtg for gov-
ernment purchases, at least in the case that Gt remains always close enough to ¹ G for
the log-linear approximation to be accurate. For an arbitrary path fGtg, the solution
for the path of output fYtg is given by (2.3). Substituting this into (3.10), one obtains
a solution for the path of the in°ation rate as well.18 It is then straightforward to
solve for the equilibrium path of the nominal interest rate, and for the path f¹ {tg of
intercepts for the central-bank reaction function (2.2). One thus obtains a policy that
implements the equilibrium conjectured in section 2.
3.2 A Strict In°ation Target
As an example of another simple hypothesis about monetary policy, suppose that the
central bank maintains a strict in°ation target, regardless of the path of government
purchases. (For conformity with the assumption made above about the long-run
steady state, suppose that the in°ation target is zero.) In the case of the Calvo model
17The latter de¯nition is chosen so that ^ Gt is de¯ned even if ¹ G = 0; and so that ^ Gt and ^ Yt are in
comparable units (i.e., percentages of steady-state output).
18Note that for any bounded sequence f ^ Gtg, the in¯nite sum is well-de¯ned.
15of price adjustment, (3.9) implies that maintaining a zero in°ation rate each period
requires that p¤
t = Pt each period. It then follows from (3.6) that this requires that
¹St = Pt each period.19 If we assume °exible wages (or e±cient labor contracting),
(3.3) implies that this will hold if and only if Yt satis¯es (1.11) each period. Hence
under this policy, aggregate output Yt will be the same function of Gt as in the case
of °exible prices, and the multiplier will be given by (1.7).
Again, this result does not depend on the precise details of the Calvo model of
price adjustment. In a wide range of speci¯cations with sticky prices (or prices set
on the basis of sticky information), a su±cient (and often necessary) condition for
zero in°ation each period is maintenance of aggregate conditions under which the
marginal cost of production satis¯es St = Pt¡1=¹ each period. For if this condition
holds, then under the assumption that each ¯rm that reconsiders its price at any
date chooses p¤
t = Pt¡1; not only will all prices remain constant over time, but each
¯rm will ¯nd that marginal revenue equals marginal cost each period, so that no ¯rm
would expect to increase pro¯ts by deviating from this pricing strategy. But such
a policy thus ensures that each ¯rm's price is equal to ¹St each period, so that the
equilibrium is the same as if all prices were fully °exible and set on the basis of full
information. Hence the multiplier will be given by (1.7), just as in the neoclassical
model.
3.3 Monetary Accommodation under a Taylor Rule
A less extreme hypothesis would assume that policy is not tightened so much in
response to a ¯scal expansion as to prevent any increase in prices, but that real
interest rates do rise in response to any increase in prices that occurs, rather than
being held constant regardless of the consequences for in°ation. For example, suppose
that interest rates are set in accordance with a \Taylor rule" of the form
it = ¹ r + Á¼¼t + Áy(^ Yt ¡ ¡ ^ Gt); (3.11)
where it is a short-term riskless nominal rate (the central bank's policy instrument), ¹ r
is the value of this rate in a steady state with zero in°ation (so that the policy rule is
consistent with that steady state), and the response coe±cients satisfy Á¼ > 1;Áy > 0;
19One can show that this is true in the exact model, and not merely in the log-linear approximation
used in (3.6).
16as proposed by Taylor (1993). Here ^ Yt¡¡ ^ Gt corresponds to one interpretation of the
\output gap," namely, the number of percentage points by which aggregate output
exceeds the °exible-price equilibrium level.
In order to determine the equilibrium implications of a policy rule of this kind, it
is useful also to log-linearize equilibrium relation (2.1), yielding20
^ Yt ¡ ^ Gt = Et[^ Yt+1 ¡ ^ Gt+1] ¡ ¾(it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ ¹ r); (3.12)
where ¾ ´ ´¡1
u > 0 measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private
expenditure.21 If we consider deterministic paths for government purchases of the
simple form ^ Gt = ^ G0½t for some 0 · ½ < 1; then the future path of government
purchases looking forward from any date t is a time-invariant function of the level of
^ Gt at that date. Conjecturing a solution of the form
^ Yt = °y ^ Gt; (3.13)
¼t = °¼ ^ Gt; (3.14)
it = ¹ r + °i ^ Gt; (3.15)
for some coe±cients °y;°¼;°i; we can substitute these equations into (3.10), (3.11)
and (3.12), and solve for the values of the coe±cients for which all three equilibrium
conditions are satis¯ed each period.
There is easily seen to be a unique solution of this form, in which
°y =
1 ¡ ½ + Ã¡











It follows from (3.13) that in this case the multiplier is simply the coe±cient °y:
One observes from (3.16) that under this policy, ¡ < °y < 1: Thus the multiplier
is necessarily higher than in the °exible-price model (or under the strict in°ation
20Again I write the log-linear approximation for the more general stochastic form of this equilib-
rium condition, as this will be used in the next section.
21Here it is a continuously compounded nominal rate | that is, it ´ ¡logQt; where Qt is the
nominal price of a bond that pays one unit of currency with certainty in period t + 1 | and
¹ r ´ ¡log¯ is the corresponding continuously compounded rare of time preference.
17targeting policy), but smaller than under the constant-real-interest rate policy. It is
higher than under strict in°ation targeting, because under the Taylor rule, in°ation
is allowed to rise somewhat in response to ¯scal stimulus; but lower than under
the constant-real-interest rate policy, because the real interest rate is increased in
response to the increases in in°ation and in the output gap. Note also that for a
policy rule of this form, the size of the multiplier depends on the degree of stickiness
of prices (through the dependence of Ã upon the value of ·); the more °exible are
prices (i.e., the smaller the value of ®), the larger is · and hence Ã; and the smaller
is the multiplier.
A still more realistic assumption about monetary policy might be to assume a
Taylor rule of the form (2.2), but with a constant intercept. (I shall assume ¹ {t = ¹ r,
for consistency with the zero-in°ation steady state.) In this case, the central bank
is assumed to respond to deviations of aggregate output from its average (or trend)
level, rather than to departures from the °exible-price equilibrium level. (In fact,
most central banks use measures of potential output that do not assume that potential
should depend on the level of government purchases, as in the speci¯cation (3.11).)
In this case, we again obtain a solution of the form (3.13){(3.15), but with di®erent
constant coe±cients; the multiplier is now given by
°y =
1 ¡ ½ + (Ã ¡ ¾Áy)¡
1 ¡ ½ + Ã
: (3.17)
The multiplier is necessarily smaller under this kind of Taylor rule, since (for any
Áy > 0) the degree to which monetary policy is tightened in response to expansionary
¯scal policy is necessarily greater. In fact, in the case of any large enough value of Áy,
the multiplier under this kind of Taylor rule is even smaller than the one predicted
by the neoclassical model. In such a case, price stickiness results in even less output
increase than would occur with °exible prices, because the central bank's reaction
function raises real interest rates more than would occur with °exible prices (and
more than is required to maintain zero in°ation). Hence while larger multipliers are
possible according to a New Keynesian model, they are predicted to occur only in the
case of a su±cient degree of monetary accommodation of the increase in real activity;
and in general, this will also require the central bank to accommodate an increase in
the rate of in°ation.
184 Fiscal Stimulus at the Zero Interest-Rate Lower
Bound
One case in which it is especially plausible to suppose that the central bank will not
tighten policy in response to an increase in government purchases is when monetary
policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on the short-term nominal interest
rate. This is a case in which it is plausible to assume not merely that the real interest
rate does not rise in response to ¯scal stimulus, but that the nominal rate does not
rise; this will actually be associated with a decrease in the real rate of interest, to
the extent that the ¯scal stimulus is associated with increased in°ation expectations.
Hence government purchases should have an especially strong e®ect on aggregate
output when the central bank's policy rate is at the zero lower bound.22 This is also
a case of particular interest, since calls for ¯scal stimulus become more urgent when
it is no longer possible to achieve as much stimulus to aggregate demand as would be
desired through interest-rate cuts alone.
In practice, the zero lower bound is most likely to become a binding constraint
on monetary policy when ¯nancial intermediation is severely disrupted, as during the
Depression or the recent ¯nancial crisis.23 A simple extension of the model proposed
above allows us to see how this can occur. Suppose that the interest rate that is
relevant in condition (2.1) for the intertemporal allocation of expenditure is not the
same as the central bank's policy rate, and furthermore that the spread between the
two interest rates varies over time, owing to changes in the e±ciency of ¯nancial
intermediation.24 If we let it denote the policy rate, and it+¢t the interest rate that
is relevant for the intertemporal allocation of expenditure, then (3.12) takes the more
general form




t ´ ¡log¯ ¡¢t is the real policy rate required to maintain a constant path
22In fact, it only matters that the policy rate be at a level that the central bank is unwilling to
go below; this \e®ective lower bound" need not be zero.
23See Christiano (2004) for a quantitative analysis of the conditions under which the zero bound
would be a binding constraint even in the absence of ¯nancial frictions.
24C¶ urdia and Woodford (2009) present a complete general equilibrium model with credit frictions
in which the policy rate is lower than the rate of interest that enters the equilibrium relation that
generalizes (3.12), and describe a number of sources of variation in the spread between the two rates.
19for private expenditure (at the steady-state level). If the spread ¢t becomes large
enough, for a period of time, as a result of a disturbance to the ¯nancial sector, then
the value of rnet
t may temporarily be negative. In such a case the zero lower bound
on it will make (4.1) incompatible, for example, with achievement of the steady state
with zero in°ation and government purchases equal to ¹ G in all periods.
4.1 A Two-State Example
As a simple example (based on Eggertsson, 2009), suppose that under normal condi-
tions, rnet
t = ¹ r > 0; but that as a result of a ¯nancial disturbance at date zero, credit
spreads increase, and rnet
t falls to a value rL < 0: Suppose that each period thereafter,
there is a probability 0 < ¹ < 1 that the elevated credit spreads persist in period t,
and that rnet
t continues to equal rL; if credit spreads were elevated in period t ¡ 1;
but with probability 1 ¡ ¹ credit spreads return to their normal level, and rnet
t = ¹ r:
Once credit spreads return to normal, they remain at the normal level thereafter.
(This exogenous evolution of the credit spread is assumed to be una®ected by either
monetary or ¯scal policy choices.)
Suppose furthermore that monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule, except
that the interest rate target is set to zero if the linear rule would call for a negative
rate; speci¯cally, let us suppose that
it = max
n
¹ r + Á¼¼t + Áy ^ Yt; 0
o
; (4.2)
so that the rule would be consistent with the zero-in°ation steady state, if rnet
t were
to equal ¹ r at all times. (We shall again suppose that Á¼ > 1;Áy > 0; as prescribed by
Taylor.) Finally, let us consider ¯scal policies under which government purchases are
equal to some level GL for all 0 · t < T; where T is the random date at which credit
spreads return to their normal level, and equal to ¹ G for all t ¸ T: The question we
wish to consider is the e®ect of choosing a higher level of government purchases GL
during the crisis, taking as given the value of ¹ G (the level of government purchases
during normal times) and the monetary policy rule (4.2).
Since there is no further uncertainty from date T onward, and the equilibrium
conditions (3.10), (4.1) and (4.2) are all purely forward-looking, it is natural to sup-
pose that the equilibrium from date T onward should be the zero-in°ation steady
20state; hence the equilibrium values will be ¼t = ^ Y = 0; it = ¹ r > 0 for all t ¸ T:25
Given this solution for the equilibrium from date T onward, we wish to determine
the equilibrium evolution prior to date T. Equilibrium conditions (3.10), (4.1) and
(4.2 can be \solved forward" to obtain a unique bounded solution if and only if the
model parameters satisfy
·¾¹ < (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¯¹): (4.3)
Note that this condition holds for all 0 · ¹ < ¹ ¹; where the upper bound ¹ ¹ < 1
depends on the model parameters (¯;·;¾): I shall here consider only the case in
which (4.3) is satis¯ed, which is to say, in which it is not expected that the crisis is
likely to persist for too many years. Then since at each date t < T; the probability
distribution of future evolutions of fundamentals (the joint evolution of frnet
t ; ^ Gtg) is
the same, the unique bounded solution obtained by \solving forward" is one in which
¼t = ¼L; ^ Yt = ^ YL;it = iL for each t < T; for certain constant values (¼L; ^ YL;iL):




(^ YL ¡ ¡ ^ GL); (4.4)
and that (4.1) requires that
(1 ¡ ¹)(^ YL ¡ ^ GL) = ¾(¡iL + ¹¼L + rL):) (4.5)
Using (4.4) to substitute for ¼L in (4.5), one obtains an equation that can be solved
to yield




(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¯¹) ¡ ·¾¹
> 0; #G ´
(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¯¹) ¡ ·¾¹¡
(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¯¹) ¡ ·¾¹
> 1: (4.7)
(Here the indicated bounds follow from (4.3) and the fact that ¡ < 1:)
One can then substitute (4.6) and the associated solution for the in°ation rate
into (4.2) and solve the resulting equation for iL: The solution lies on the branch of







#r rL < 0: (4.8)
25One can show that this is a locally determinate rational-expectations equilibrium for dates
t ¸ T, under the policies assumed; that is, it is the only solution in which in°ation and output
remain within certain bounded intervals.
21This is the case of interest here; assuming that rL is negative enough for (4.8) to
hold, the zero lower bound will bind in the case that government purchases remain at








#r(¡rL) ¡ ¹ r
·
1¡¯¹Á¼(#G ¡ ¡) + Áy#G
> 0:
For any level of government purchases below this critical level, equilibrium output
will be given by
^ YL = #rrL + #G ^ GL (4.9)
for all t < T; and the in°ation rate will equal the value ¼L given by (4.4).
In this equilibrium, there will be both de°ation and a negative output gap (output
below its level with °exible wages and prices), for as long as credit spreads remain
elevated, in the case of any level of government purchases GL · Gcrit:27 The de°ation
and economic contraction can be quite severe, for even a modestly negative value of
rL, in the case that ¹ is large; in fact, #r (the multiplier dY=dr plotted in Figure 2)
becomes unboundedly large as ¹ approaches ¹ ¹. Under such circumstances, it can be
highly desirable to stimulate aggregate demand by increasing the level of government
purchases.
For levels of government purchases up to Gcrit; (4.9) implies that each additional
dollar spend by the government increases GDP by #G dollars.28 Increases in govern-
26Note that if, as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), it is assumed that the central bank pursues
a strict zero in°ation target as long as this is consistent with the zero lower bound, then the zero
lower bound necessarily binds at dates t < T if ^ GL = 0; as long as rL < 0: The values computed
here for the multipliers dYL=drL and dYL=dGL are the same under that simpler hypothesis.
27As illustrated in Figure 1, output may nonetheless exceed its steady-state level; for the parameter
values assumed in the ¯gure, YL exceeds ¹ Y (so that ^ YL > 0) for values of GL near Gcrit, though the
output gap remains negative, because the increased government purchases increase the \natural"
level of output.
28Note that this multiplier is calculated using approximations to the model structural equations
that have been log-linearized around the zero-in°ation steady state, as in Eggertsson (2009) and
Christiano et al. (2009). However, the case considered here is necessarily some distance from
that steady state, so that the derivatives used need not yield a correct multiplier. (The multiplier
computed here is correct only in the case that rL is a su±ciently small negative quantity, so that
¼L and ^ YL remain close to zero when ^ GL = 0.) Braun and Waki (2010) ¯nd that log-linearization
around the zero-in°ation steady state can substantially exaggerate the size of the multiplier under
realistic parameter values; but they still conclude on the basis of their nonlinear analysis that the













Figure 1: Output as a function of the level of government purchases during the
period (t < T) in which credit spreads remain elevated. A \Great Depression" shock
is assumed, parameterized as in Eggertsson (2009).
ment purchases beyond that level result in even higher levels of GDP, though the
increase per dollar of additional government purchases is smaller, as shown in Figure
1, owing to the central bank's increase in interest rates in accordance with the Taylor
rule. (Figure 1 plots ^ YL as a function of ^ GL; for the numerical parameter values
proposed by Eggertsson, 2009.29 Under these parameter values, Gcrit is reached when
multiplier is well above 1.
29Eggertsson chooses parameter values to ¯t the size of the contraction experienced by the U.S.
economy during the Great Depression. According to his modal parameter estimates (for a quarterly
model), ¯ = 0:997;· = 0:00859;¾ = 0:862; and ¡ = 0:425: The shock required to account for the
size of the contraction during the Depression is one under which rL = ¡0:010 (minus 4 percent
per annum) and ¹ = 0:903 (an expected mean duration a little over 10 quarters); the response
coe±cients for monetary policy are assumed to be Á¼ = 1:5;Áy = 0:25: (The justi¯cation of these
parameter values is discussed in greater detail in Denes and Eggertsson, 2009). Note that because
I use a simpler model of the labor market in the current exposition, · is not the same function of
underlying parameters in (3.10) above as in Eggertsson's paper. Here I parameterize the model so
23government purchases exceed their steady-state value by 13.6 percent of steady-state
GDP.30) For values GL > Gcrit; the multiplier is no longer #G, but instead the co-
e±cient °y de¯ned in (3.17), where the persistence parameter ½ is now replaced by
¹:31
It follows from (4.7) that the multiplier dYL=dGL = #G for government purchases
up to the level ^ Gcrit is necessarily greater than 1 (for any ¹ > 0). The reason is that,
given that the nominal interest rate remains at zero in periods t < T; an increase in
GL; which increases ¼L, accordingly increases expected in°ation (given some positive
probability of elevated credit spreads continuing for another period), and so lowers
the real rate of interest.32 Hence monetary policy is even more accommodative than
is assumed in the benchmark analysis in section 2, and the increase in aggregate
output is correspondingly higher.
The degree to which the multiplier exceeds 1 in this case can, in principle, be quite
considerable. In fact, for any given values of the other parameters, the multiplier
while the policy rate remains at the zero bound can be unboundedly large, for a
su±ciently value of the persistence parameter ¹. Figure 2 plots the multiplier as
a function of ¹, holding the other model parameters ¯xed at the values used by
Eggertsson (2009). The ¯gure illustrates something that can be observed from (4.7)
to hold quite generally: the multiplier is monotonically increasing in ¹; and increases
that the value of · is the same as in Eggertsson's paper, meaning that implicitly the value of ® is
larger than the value assumed by Eggertsson. The di®erence in the values assumed for ® has no
consequences for the multiplier calculations discussed here.
30In drawing the ¯gure, I have also assumed that the credit spread is zero in the \normal" state,
so that ¹ r = ¡log¯: Allowing for a small positive credit spread in this state would raise the value of
Gcrit:
31Under Eggertsson's parameter values, this quantity is equal only to 0.3. (Note that this is a case
in which, when the central bank is not constrained by the zero bound, the multiplier under a Taylor
rule that responds to detrended output is actually lower than the neoclassical benchmark; for under
Eggertsson's parameter values, ¡ = 0:4:) Under the alternative hypothesis that the central bank
implements a strict zero in°ation target, except when prevented by the zero bound, the multiplier
above the critical level of government purchases is equal to ¡: If instead the central bank follows a
Taylor rule of the form (3.11), the multiplier beyond the critical level of government purchases is
given by (3.16).
32Note that the increase in expected in°ation referred to here is actually a reduction in the
expected rate of de°ation. For all levels of government purchases below Gcrit; the output gap
remains negative (output remains below the °exible-price equilibrium level), and it is expected to
be non-positive in all future periods as well, so that a negative rate of in°ation is implied by (3.10).














Figure 2: Derivatives of YL with respect to the values of rL and GL; for alternative
assumed degrees of persistence ¹ of the ¯nancial disturbance. Other parameter values
are taken from Eggertsson (2009).
without bound as ¹ approaches ¹ ¹: The ¯gure also indicates that the multiplier is
in general not too much greater than 1, except if ¹ is fairly large. However, it is
important to note that the case in which ¹ is large (in particular, a large fraction of
¹ ¹) is precisely the case in which the multiplier dYL=drL is also large, which is to say,
the case in which a moderate increase in the size of credit spreads can cause a severe
output collapse.33
Thus increased government purchases when interest rates are at the zero bound
should be a powerful means through which to stave o® economic crisis precisely
in those cases in which the constraint of the zero lower bound would otherwise be
most crippling | namely, those cases in which there is insu±cient con¯dence that
the disruption of credit markets will be short-lived. For example, in Eggertsson's
numerical example, a contraction of the size experienced during the Great Depression
33See Denes and Eggertsson (2009) for further discussion of this point.
25occurs as a result of a disturbance with a persistence coe±cient of ¹ = 0:903; in
the case of this kind of disturbance, his parameter values imply a multiplier of 2.3.
Christiano et al. (2009) similarly ¯nd that a multiplier above 2 is possible at the
zero lower bound, in the context of a more complex New Keynesian model that is
estimated to match a large number of features of postwar U.S. data.
Evidence on the e®ects of defense spending during the 1930s suggest that substan-
tial multipliers of this kind may indeed be possible during circumstances like those
of the Great Depression. For example, Almunia et al. (2010) estimate panel vector
autoregressions using data from 27 countries for the period 1925-1939, and look at the
response to innovations in defense purchases, taken to represent exogenous changes
in government purchases; depending on the speci¯cation used, they ¯nd a multiplier
during the year of the innovation of either 2.5 (their Figure 14) or 2.1 (their Figure
19). Gordon and Krenn (2010) similarly ¯nd a multiplier greater than 1 for the e®ects
of innovations in government purchases on U.S. real GDP during the military buildup
between 1940:Q2 and 1941:Q4. It is arguable that these relatively high multipliers
for defense purchases during the Depression, relative to those found by studies of the
e®ects of defense purchases at other times (e.g., those summarized in Hall, 2009),
re°ect a greater degree of monetary accommodation under Depression circumstances
than has been typical of other military buildups.34
4.2 Importance of the Duration of Fiscal Stimulus
Cogan et al. (2010) instead ¯nd that a leading empirical New Keynesian model of
the U.S. economy predicts small multiplier e®ects of increased government purchases
during a situation in which the zero lower bound is assumed to bind. For example,
when Cogan et al. consider the e®ect of a permanent increase in government purchases
of 1 percent of GDP, they ¯nd an increase in GDP of only 1.0 percent in the ¯rst
quarter, which falls to only 0.6 percent by the end of the second year (the period
over which they assume that the federal funds rate rate remains at zero), and to
only 0.4 percent after four years. In the case of an assumed path of government
purchases intended to mimic projected expenditure under the February 2009 U.S.
federal stimulus package, their model implies an increase in GDP substantially smaller
34In fact, the VAR results of Almunia et al. show central-bank discount rates being reduced,
rather than increased, in response to a positive innovation in defense purchases.
26than the increase in government purchases in all quarters, and hence a particularly
modest increase in output during the ¯rst year of their simulation.
What accounts for the di®erence with the large multiplier obtained at the zero
bound by Eggertsson (2009)? While the empirical model used by Cogan et al. is
substantially more complex, this is probably not the most important di®erence in
their analysis.35 The crucial di®erence is that the calculations above assume an
increase in government purchases that lasts precisely as long as credit spreads are
elevated, and hence precisely as long as the zero lower bound is a binding constraint,
following which period Gt = ¹ G again each period; Cogan et al. instead consider
increases in government purchases that are initiated at a time when interest rates
are zero, but that extend much longer than the period over which the interest rate is
assumed to remain at zero.
In our simple model as well, the increase in output is predicted to be much smaller
if a substantial part of the increased government purchases are expected to occur
after the zero lower bound ceases to bind. For as explained above, once interest
rates are determined by a Taylor rule, a higher level of government purchases should
crowd out private spending (raising the marginal utility of private expenditure), and
may well cause lower in°ation as well.36 But the expectation of a higher marginal
utility of expenditure and of lower in°ation in the event that credit spreads normalize
in the following period both act as disincentives to private expenditure while the
nominal interest rate remains at zero. Hence while there is a positive e®ect on output
during the crisis of increased government purchases at dates t < T; an anticipation of
increased government purchases at dates t ¸ T has a negative e®ect on output prior
to date T.
A simple calculation can illustrate this. Suppose that instead of the two-state
Markov chain considered above, there are three states: after the \crisis" state (in
which rnet
t = rL and ^ Gt = ^ GL) ends, there is a probability 0 < ¸ < 1 each period that
government purchases will remain at their elevated level ( ^ Gt = ^ GL), even though
rnet
t = ¹ r, though with probability 1 ¡ ¸ each period the economy returns to the
35The empirical model considered by Christiano et al. (2009) has a structure very similar to the
one used by Cogan et al., yet Christiano et al. obtain multipliers well in excess of 1 for a policy
experiment similar to the one analyzed above.
36Both things occur in the case of the Eggertsson (2009) parameter values explained in footnote
29.
27\normal" state (in which rnet
t = ¹ r and Gt = ¹ G) and remains there forever after. If we
let (¼S; ^ YS;iS) be the constant values for (¼t; ^ Yt;it) in the transitional state (i.e., for
all T ¸ t < T 0; where T 0 is the random date at which government purchases return to
their \normal" level), then the value of Et^ Yt+1 during the \crisis" period is not ¹^ YL;
but ¹^ YL + (1 ¡ ¹)¸^ YS; and similarly for expected future government purchases and
expected future in°ation. We can repeat the previous derivation, obtaining instead
of (4.9) the more general form
^ YL = #rrL + #G ^ GL + #¼¼S + #C(^ YS ¡ ^ GL); (4.10)
where
#¼ ´ (1 ¡ ¹)¸#r > 0; #C ´ ¾
¡1#¼ > 0:
The fact that #¼;#C > 0 indicates that an expectation of either lower private ex-
penditure or lower in°ation in the transitional state will lower output during the
crisis.
Using the same reasoning as in the previous section, one can show that the lev-
els of output and in°ation during the transitional state, when the interest rate is
determined by the Taylor rule but government purchases remain high, are given by
^ YS = °y ^ GL;¼S = °¼ ^ GL; where °y is the coe±cient de¯ned in (3.17) (but with the
persistence coe±cient ½ equal to ¸) and °¼ is the corresponding in°ation coe±cient.
One thus obtains a multiplier
dYL
dGL
= #G + #¼°¼ + #C(°y ¡ 1) (4.11)
for government purchases below the critical level that causes the zero bound to no
longer bind even in the crisis state. Since °Y < 1 as explained earlier, the contribution
of the ¯nal term is necessarily negative. In the case that either of the response
coe±cients (Á¼;Áy) is su±ciently large, the Taylor rule will not allow a large increase
in in°ation during the transitional phase, and one obtains a multiplier smaller than
#G when ¸ > 0:
Figure 3 plots the value of the multiplier (4.11) as a function of ¸; in the case
that the other parameters take the values proposed by Eggertsson (2009). When
¸ = 0; the multiplier is nearly 2.3, as reported by Eggertsson, but it steadily falls as
¸ is increased. For values of ¸ equal to 0.8 or higher (an expected duration of the
¯scal stimulus for 4 quarters or more after the end of the ¯nancial disturbance), the


















Figure 3: Derivative of YL with respect to GL; for alternative degrees of persistence
¸ of the ¯scal stimulus after the end of the ¯nancial disturbance. Other parameter
values are taken from Eggertsson (2009).
multiplier falls below 1. For values of ¸ equal to 0.91 or higher (an expected duration
of 10 quarters or more), the multiplier is negative. In particular, in the case of a
permanent increase in the level of government purchases (the case ¸ = 1), as in the
¯rst case considered by Cogan et al., the multiplier is strongly negative (nearly -5!).
Hence a ¯nding that a long-lasting ¯scal stimulus is predicted to increase output only
modestly, as in the simulations of Cogan et al., does not mean that a better-targeted
¯scal stimulus cannot be much more e®ective.
Nor is it the case that to be e®ective, the government spending must occur im-
mediately. In the model considered here, an increase in government purchases during
a period in which the interest rate is zero, which is expected to last for the current
quarter only, so that there is no change in expected future government purchases,
has a multiplier of exactly 1. (This is because with no change in expected future
¯scal policy, there is no change in expected future output or in°ation. This means no
29change in expected real interest rates in future periods, and, as long as the tempo-
rary increase in Gt remains within the range which implies a current nominal interest
rate of zero, no change in the current real interest rate either. Hence the benchmark
analysis in section 2 applies.) It follows that when Eggertsson obtains a multiplier
of 2.3, 1.0 of this is due to the increase in government purchases during the current
quarter, while the other 1.3 is the e®ect of higher anticipated government purchases
in the future.
Hence even if there were no increase in government purchases in the current quar-
ter at all, an expectation of higher government purchases in all future quarters prior
to date T would increase output immediately by an amount that is 1.3 times as large
as the promised future increase in the level of government purchases. Of course,
an even longer delay would attenuate the e®ects on output at the time of the an-
nouncement to an even greater extent. Still, New Keynesian models certainly do not
imply that a delayed ¯scal stimulus will serve no purpose | as long as the eventual
increase in government spending is contingent on the continued existence of the ¯nan-
cial disruption that justi¯es the emergency measures. The kind of stimulus package
that is ine®ective, or even counter-productive, is one under which a large part of the
increased government purchases are expected to occur in a post-crisis environment
in which monetary policy is not expected to accommodate an increase in aggregate
demand.37
5 Government Purchases and Welfare
Thus far, I have simply considered the extent to which it is possible for an increase
in government spending to increase aggregate output and employment, taking it for
granted (as in much popular discussion) that an increase in output would be desir-
able, at least under circumstances where output would otherwise be below its trend
path. But it is reasonable to ask whether our models imply not only that increased
government purchases will increase GDP, but that they will increase economic welfare
as well. This does not follow trivially from the existence of a positive multiplier (or
even a multiplier greater than 1); one must consider the value of the use to which the
37This is illustrated not only by the simulations of Cogan et al. (2010), but also by those of Erceg
and Lind¶ e (2009) for the case of a \gradual increase in government purchases" that continue beyond
the point at which the zero bound ceases to bind.
30resources consumed by the government would otherwise be put.
5.1 Fiscal Stabilization in the Neoclassical Model
In the case of the neoclassical model, it is evident that if government purchases are
of no intrinsic value (\paying people to dig holes and then ¯ll them again"), the
optimal level of government purchases must be zero, for any government purchases
crowd out private expenditure and increase the disutility of working. But of course
some kinds of government spending do bene¯t the public; we can represent this by
making the utility of the representative household depend on Gt, the level of public
goods provision. The calculations above are una®ected by this hypothesis, as long as
we suppose that utility is additively separable in public goods (the tacit assumption





t [u(Ct) + g(Gt) ¡ v(Ht)]; (5.1)
where g0 > 0;g00 · 0: (Of course, the value of public projects does not depend solely
on the amount that is spent on them. But it is an obvious principle of optimal ¯scal
policy that the projects ¯nanced should be those that yield the greatest additional
utility per dollar spent; the function g(G) accordingly indicates the utility obtained
in this case.)
Given that for any path fGtg of government purchases, the competitive equilib-
rium will maximize the utility of the representative household, it is easily seen that




0(Yt ¡ Gt) (5.2)
each period. This condition has a simple interpretation: government purchases should
be undertaken if and only if they have a marginal utility as high as that associated
with additional private expenditure | i.e., if they satisfy the conventional (microe-
conomic) cost-bene¯t criterion. One way of stating this criterion is to say that gov-
ernment purchases should be chosen so as to maximize u(Yt ¡ Gt) + g(Gt), taking
as given the quantity of aggregate expenditure Yt. (I shall call this the criterion of
38For extension of the neoclassical theory to the case in which public goods are at least partially
substitutes for private expenditure, see, e.g., Baxter and King (1993).
31e±cient composition of expenditure.) Plainly, this is not a criterion that requires
one, in choosing whether to undertake a particular public project, to think about the
consequences of government spending for aggregate demand.
5.2 Fiscal Stabilization When Monetary Policy is Optimal
There is greater scope for ¯scal stabilization policy in the case that prices or wages
are sticky (or based on older information than that available to the government). If a
recession is a time when output is below the full-information °exible-wage/price level,
owing to stickiness of one sort or another, this implies a misallocation of resources,
and a potential justi¯cation for ¯scal stimulus to \¯ll the output gap." If an increase
in government purchases Gt is associated with an increase in output Yt that period
(abstracting, for the moment, from changes in the allocation of resources in any other
periods), utility will be increased if the relative size of the two changes satis¯es the
condition
(u






0) > 0: (5.3)
In the neoclassical case, equilibrium condition (1.6) implies that the ¯rst term in (5.3)
is necessarily zero, so that increased government purchases increase welfare only to
the extent that g0 exceeds u0: But if during a recession, u0 > ~ v0, the condition can be
satis¯ed even when u0 exceeds g0 to some extent; this will be more likely to be true
the greater the extent to which u0 exceeds ~ v0 (i.e., the more negative the output gap),
and the greater the multiplier e®ects of government purchases.
Yet it is important to remember that in New Keynesian models, both the size
of the output gap and the size of the multiplier will depend on monetary policy;
and while there might well be signi¯cant opportunities for ¯scal stabilization policy
under the assumption that prices, wages or information are sticky and that monetary
policy is inept, the most obvious solution in such a case is to increase the accuracy
of monetary stabilization policy. Indeed, given that e®ective monetary stabilization
policy should prevent there from being large variations in the ratio of u0 to ~ v0 (by
stabilizing the output gap), it is not obvious that the novel considerations mentioned
in the previous paragraph should be of great quantitative signi¯cance when monetary
policy is used optimally.
A case that is especially simple to analyze is that in which we suppose that there
exists a constant employment or output subsidy, of precisely the magnitude necessary
32to o®set the distortion owing to the market power of monopolistically competitive
producers.39 In this case, the factor ¹ > 1 in (1.11) is canceled, and the equilibrium
with (full-information) °exible prices and wages is e±cient, despite the assumption
of monopolistic competition. Now suppose that prices are sticky (or set on the basis
of sticky information), while wages are °exible (or there is e±cient contracting in the
labor market). A monetary policy that maintains price stability at all times achieves
the (full-information) °exible-price equilibrium allocation, regardless of the path of
government purchases, as discussed above in section 3.1.; hence this policy maximizes
expected utility, given the path of government purchases.40 Thus one may conclude
that, regardless of the path of government purchases, an optimal monetary policy
achieves the allocation of resources predicted by the neoclassical model.41 But then
the condition for optimality of the level of government purchases is again simply (5.2),
which is to say, the principle of e±cient composition of expenditure.
It is not simply a matter of there being two instruments which can each, in prin-
ciple, address the problem of an insu±cient level of aggregate nominal expenditure,
given the existing level of prices or wages, so that it does not matter which instru-
ment is used for the job. Rather, to the extent that the problem can be solved using
monetary policy, it is costless to do so, since monetary policy has no other aims to
ful¯ll; whereas, while government spending can also be used to ameliorate the prob-
lem, this has a cost, since it requires the diversion of real resources to alternative
uses. Whenever government purchases are used for aggregate demand management,
there is a tension between this goal and the choice of government purchases so as to
maintain an optimal composition of expenditure. Since there is no equally important
con°ict in the case of the use of monetary policy for aggregate demand management,
monetary policy should be used to the extent possible; and this should largely allow
decisions about government purchases to be made from the standpoint of the optimal
composition of expenditure.
39For example, it su±ces that there be a subsidy equal to fraction ¿ of a ¯rm's payroll, where
¿ = 1 ¡ ¹¡1 > 0; and ¹ > 1 is the markup factor in (1.11).
40For a more formal presentation of this argument, see Woodford (2003, chap. 6, sec. 3.1).
41This result depends on an assumption that the zero lower bound on interest rates does not
prevent monetary policy from achieving its in°ation target at some points in time. The importance
of this caveat is made clear in the following section.
335.3 Fiscal Stabilization at the Zero Lower Bound
There is, however, one case in which a much stronger argument can be made for the
usefulness of variations in government spending for stabilization purposes. This is
when a ¯nancial disturbance makes it impossible for monetary policy to maintain
price stability and a zero output gap at all times, as the required path for the policy
rate would violate the zero lower bound. Under such circumstances, substantial
distortions due to de°ation and a large negative output gap can exist in equilibrium,
even with a central bank that maintains a strict zero in°ation target whenever this
is consistent a non-negative interest rate. It can then be desirable to use government
purchases to \¯ll the output gap," at least partially, even at the price of distorting
to some extent the composition of expenditure in the economy.
As an example, let us consider the welfare e®ects of ¯scal stimulus in the two-
state example of section 4.1. Suppose that the central bank maintains a strict zero
in°ation target whenever this is possible, and a nominal interest rate of zero whenever
de°ation is unavoidable;42 and let us consider only ¯scal policies under which Gt is
equal to some constant GL for all t < T, and equal to ¹ G for all t ¸ T; where ¹ G is
the optimal level of government purchases under \normal" conditions, that is, the
value that satis¯es (5.2) when Yt = ¹ Y . The analysis is simpli¯ed if we again assume
the existence of a subsidy such that the °exible-price equilibrium allocation would
be optimal. In this case, the steady state with Yt = ¹ Y and Gt = ¹ G represents an
optimal allocation of resources, and the assumed monetary policy would be optimal
in the event that credit spreads were to remain always modest in size, so that the
zero bound were never a binding constraint. I wish to consider the welfare e®ects of
increasing GL above the normal level ¹ G; and the way in which the optimal choice of
GL depends on the size and expected duration of the ¯nancial disturbance.
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42This corresponds to a limiting case of the policy considered in section 4.1, in which Á¼ is made
unboundedly large.









+ 1 ¡ ¡
¸
¡ ¸y > 0;
and ´g ¸ 0 is (the negative of) the elasticity of g0 with respect to G, a measure of the
degree to which there are diminishing returns to additional government expenditure.
Here the ¯nal two terms inside the square brackets represent a quadratic approxima-
tion to u(Yt ¡ Gt) + g(Gt) ¡ ~ v(Yt), which would be the period contribution to utility
if the prices of all goods were the same, as would occur with °exible prices or in
an environment with complete price stability; the additional ¼2
t term represents the
additional welfare loss owing to an ine±cient composition of the economy's aggregate
product as a result of price dispersion.
If the zero bound were never a binding constraint on monetary policy, the only
constraint on feasible paths for the in°ation rate and the output gap ^ Yt¡¡ ^ Gt would be
(3.10), regardless of the path of f ^ Gtg; hence optimal monetary policy would maintain
a zero in°ation rate and output gap at all times, reducing each of the ¯rst two terms
inside the square brackets in (5.4) to their minimum possible values each period. The
optimal path of government purchases would then be chosen simply to minimize the
remaining term, by setting ^ Gt = 0 each period. (This would achieve an optimal
composition of expenditure, as it would result in Yt = ¹ Y ;Gt = ¹ G each period.)
In the case considered here, however, the zero lower bound on interest rates pre-
cludes this ¯rst-best outcome. Under a policy in the family proposed above, the
equilibrium is of the kind characterized in section 4.1. In any equilibrium of this
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The optimal policy within this family is therefore obtained by minimizing (5.5) with
respect to ^ GL; taking into account the dependence of (¼L; ^ YL) on ^ GL implied by (4.4)
and (4.9). The ¯rst-order conditions for the minimization of this quadratic objective
subject to the two linear constraints can be uniquely solved for a linear solution,
^ GL = ¡
»(#G ¡ ¡)#r
»(#G ¡ ¡)2 + ¸g
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Figure 4: The optimal value of ^ GL=jrLj, for alternative values of ¹, under two di®erent
assumptions about the size of ´g. (Case A: ´g = 0. Case B: ´g = 4´u:) The solid line
shows the value of ^ GL=jrLj required to maintain a zero output gap.
(This solution for the optimal value of ^ GL is necessarily positive, because #G > ¡ and
rL < 0:)
Figure 4 plots the optimal value of ^ GL=jrLj de¯ned by (5.6), for alternative values
of ¹, assuming the values for the model parameters ¯;·;¾;¡ and µ proposed by
Eggertsson (2009).44 For a given ¯nancial disturbance parameterized by (rL;¹), the
optimal size of the increase in government purchases can be determined from the
¯gure by observing the optimal ratio for that value of ¹; and then multiplying by
the value of jrLj. Thus a value of 2 on the vertical axis means that if rL is equal to
-4 percent per annum, it would be optimal to increase government purchases by an
amount equal to 8 percent of GDP.
The optimal value is plotted under two di®erent assumptions about the degree of
44In addition to the parameter values reported in footnote 29 above, it is now also assumed that
µ = 12:77:
36diminishing returns to additional government expenditure. In case A, it is assumed
that utility is linear in government purchases (´g = 0); this provides an upper bound
for the degree to which it can be cost-e®ective to increase government purchases. In
case B, it is instead assumed that ´g = 4´u; this corresponds to the case in which the
marginal utility of government purchases decreases at the same rate (per percentage
point increase in spending) as the marginal utility of private purchases, and private
expenditure is 4 times as large as government purchases in the steady state. In this
case, because of the diminishing returns to additional government purchases, the
optimal increase in government spending is less for any given ¯nancial disturbance.
For purposes of comparison, the solid line in Figure 4 also plots the level of government
purchases that would be required to fully eliminate the output gap (i.e., keep output
at the °exible-price equilibrium level) and prevent any decline in in°ation as a result
of the ¯nancial disturbance. (This line also indicates the critical level of government
purchases at which the zero lower bound ceases to bind, given the central bank's
assumed policy.)
The ¯gure shows that it is optimal to use discretionary (state-dependent) gov-
ernment purchases to partially o®set the decline in output and in°ation that would
otherwise occur as a result of the ¯nancial disturbance. It should be noted, how-
ever, that it is not optimal to fully stabilize in°ation and the output gap, despite
the feasibility of doing so, because of the ine±cient composition of expenditure that
this would involve. In the case that the ¯nancial disturbance is not too persistent
(¹ = 0:5 or less), the optimal increase in government purchases is only a small frac-
tion of the increase that would be required to eliminate the output gap, if we assume
diminishing returns to additional public expenditure similar to those that exist for
private expenditure. (The optimal ¯scal stimulus would be even smaller if one were
to assume even more sharply diminishing returns to public expenditure, or if one were
to take into account the distortions involved in raising government revenues.) At the
same time, the optimal size of ¯scal stimulus can be quite substantial, and a large
fraction of the size required for full stabilization of both in°ation and the output gap,
in the case that ¹ is large. In this case | when there is believed to be a substantial
probability that the ¯nancial disruption will persist for years, and when a serious
depression could result in the absence of ¯scal stimulus | welfare is maximized by
an aggressive increase in government purchases, of nearly the size required to fully
stabilize in°ation and the output gap.
376 Consequences of Distortionary Taxation
The analyses above have for simplicity assumed lump-sum taxation. This is clearly
unrealistic, but because there is no necessary connection between a path of govern-
ment purchases and the path of distorting taxes (of various types) used to ¯nance it,
a full analysis of the complications raised by taking into account tax distortions is
not possible here. If increased government purchases are ¯nanced by an increase in
a proportional tax on wage income or on consumption purchases (for example), the
increased tax wedge will increase the real marginal cost of supplying a given level of
output (assuming °exible wages). In a neoclassical model (where real marginal cost
can never di®er from 1 in equilibrium), the increased tax distortion will lower equi-
librium output, and may even negate the increase in equilibrium output that would
occur with lump-sum taxation for the reason explained in section 1.
For example, in the case of ¯nancing entirely through a proportional tax ¿t on
sales revenues, condition (1.6) becomes instead
(1 ¡ ¿t)u
0(Yt ¡ Gt) = ~ v
0(Yt); (6.1)
from which it follows that Yt is a decreasing function of ¿t, for a given level of Gt: If
u(C) = logC and a balanced budget is maintained each period (so that ¿tYt = Gt),
equation (6.1) reduces to
Y
¡1
t = ~ v
0(Yt);
and it is easily seen that the solution for Yt is independent of Gt (so that the multiplier
is zero). If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private expenditure is even
smaller, the multiplier will even be negative. Thus it might seem a serious omission
to discuss the plausibility of a substantial government expenditure multiplier without
taking into account the e®ects of distorting taxes.
But here again, the stickiness of prices and/or wages, and the nature of the as-
sumed monetary policy response, makes an important di®erence. In the benchmark
case considered in section 2, where monetary policy is assumed to maintain a constant
path for the real interest rate, taking account of tax distortions would not change the
conclusion that the government expenditure multiplier is equal to 1, as long as the
change in ¯scal policy is assumed not to change the long run level of tax distortions
(which would matter for the determination of ¹ Y and hence of ¹ C). If a temporary
increase in government purchases requires a corresponding temporary increase in the
38tax rate applied to wage income, the increase in real marginal cost will imply that
the monetary policy required to keep the real interest rate constant will be even more
in°ationary than in the case of lump-sum taxation.
For example, in the case of Calvo pricing, and again assuming a proportional sales
tax and a balanced budget each period as in the above example, in°ation will again be
determined by (3.10), where now ¡ will be the balanced-budget neoclassical multiplier
implied by (6.1). Under the constant-real-interest-rate policy, the multiplier will still
equal 1, so that ^ Yt = ^ Gt each period; but since the tax distortions reduce the size of
¡ (for given preferences, technology, and steady-state level of government purchases),
the implied increase in ^ Yt¡¡ ^ Gt will be greater than in the case of lump-sum taxation,
and so the implied increase in in°ation will be greater. (The multipliers implied by
the hypothesis of a strict in°ation target, or by monetary policy following a Taylor
rule, will instead be lower in the case of the distorting tax, just as in the neoclassical
model.)
In the case of an increase in government purchases while monetary policy is con-
strained by the zero lower bound, the multiplier would actually be increased if we
assume that the increased government purchases are ¯nanced by a balanced-budget
increase in the tax rate on wage income. The reason is that the increase in the tax
wedge makes the policy even more in°ationary, for the reason just explained. But
an increase in expected in°ation during the period while the nominal interest rate is
constrained to equal zero will mean that real interest rates fall even more than in the
analysis in section 4, resulting in an even greater increase in output.45
Thus the main conclusions of the simple analysis above have not been exaggerated
by abstracting from the e®ects of tax distortions. Even if the increase in government
purchases must be ¯nanced entirely by an increase in a wage income tax, it remains
the case that sticky prices and/or wages make multipliers greater than or equal to
one possible; that a monetary policy that maintains the real interest rate constant
is su±cient to ensure a multiplier of one; and that a multiplier greater than one
(under certain circumstances, substantially greater) should be expected in the case
of an increase in government purchases while monetary policy is constrained by the
zero lower bound | though in the last case, an additional proviso is now required,
that the increase in the wage income tax must also occur while interest rates remain
45See Eggertsson (2009) for a detailed analysis of the expansionary e®ects of certain kinds of tax
increases when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound.
39at zero. Taking account of tax distortions also further underlines the importance of
the expected duration of \¯scal stimulus" in response to an economic crisis, already
emphasized in the analysis above. To the extent that tax distortions (such as increased
tax on wage income) are expected to continue to be higher even after the zero lower
bound ceases to be a binding constraint, then | assuming that monetary policy is
subsequently determined by a strict in°ation target or by a Taylor rule, as above |
this fact will further reduce expected output after credit spreads normalize, further
increase the expected marginal utility of income at that time, and so give households
a motive to save more during the crisis. Policy expectations of this kind can therefore
be highly counter-productive, as Drautzburg and Uhlig (2010) ¯nd in the context of
a more complex, empirical New Keynesian model.46
7 Conclusion
We may summarize our conclusions as follows. Under circumstances like those of
a Great Depression | that is, when a disturbance to the ¯nancial sector results in
insu±cient aggregate demand even with the central bank's policy rate at the lower
bound of zero, and when there is feared to be a substantial probability of the con-
straint continuing to bind for years to come | standard models of the kind widely
used in analyses of monetary stabilization policy imply that the government expen-
diture multiplier should be larger than one, and may be well above one. Moreover,
in the case of the kind of (purely forward-looking) monetary policy assumed in the
analysis above, we have found that not only is there a large e®ect on output of an
increase in government expenditure under Depression-like circumstances, but up to
a certain point an increase in government purchases will increase welfare as well; in
the case of a su±ciently persistent disturbance (the case in which the zero bound
can lead to a serious output collapse), the optimal increase in government purchases
can be nearly as large as the increase that would be required to completely eliminate
the \output gap," i.e., to raise output to its °exible-price equilibrium level (which
will itself be higher due to the temporary increase in government purchases). Hence
a case can be made for quite an aggressive increase in government purchases under
such circumstances, even taking account of the increased tax distortions required in
46See also the discussion of the consequences of delayed ¯nancing through labor income taxation
in Erceg and Lind¶ e (2009).
40order to ¯nance the increase in government purchases.
Nonetheless, under less extreme circumstances, the case for using variations in
government purchases for stabilization purposes is much weaker. Even when the
zero lower bound is a binding constraint, if the disturbance that causes it to bind
is not expected to be too persistent, then even though the multiplier for increased
purchases while the constraint still binds will be at least slightly greater than one, it
need not be much greater than one; and the optimal increase in government purchases
is probably only a small fraction of what would be required to \¯ll the output gap."
When monetary policy is not constrained by the zero lower bound, there is a good case
for leaving output-gap stabilization largely to monetary policy, and basing decisions
about government purchases primarily, if not entirely, on the principle of e±cient
composition of aggregate expenditure.
And ¯nally, even when the zero lower bound is a temporarily binding constraint
on monetary policy, the case just made for ¯scal stimulus while the constraint binds
applies only to the case in which the increased government purchases will be termi-
nated as soon as the constraint ceases to bind, and in which the tax increases required
to ¯nance them also occur while the constraint binds. Either an increase in govern-
ment purchases that continues after monetary policy ceases to be constrained, or tax
increases thereafter that may be required to pay o® debt issued during the crisis, is
likely | to the extent such a change in future ¯scal policy is correctly forecasted, and
intertemporal expenditure decisions are forward-looking | to signi¯cantly reduce the
stimulative e®ects of increased government purchases during the crisis, and a fortiori
to reduce the net welfare gains from the policy. Hence while a case for aggressive ¯scal
stimulus can be made under certain circumstances, such a policy must be designed
with care if it is to have the desired e®ect. And, as is now widely understood in the
context of monetary stabilization policy, careful signalling about the likely direction
of future policy is likely to be as important as current actions.
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